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Tracing Forensic Artifacts from USB-Bound 
Computing Environments on Windows Hosts 
 
By Jan Collie

 
 
This paper proposes that it is possible to extract and analyse artifacts of potential 
evidential interest from host systems where miniature computing environments are run 
from USB connectable devices. The research focuses on Windows systems and 
includes a comparison of the results obtained following a traditional ‘static’ forensic 
data collection after conducting a range of user-initiated activities. Four software 
products were evaluated during this research cycle, all of which could be used as anti-
forensic tools. It is shown that the environments reviewed create numerous artifacts in 
both live and unallocated space on Windows hosts that are retained after a system 
halt. These include multiple references to identified software and related processes as 
well as named user activity in the Registry keys, the IconCache.db and elsewhere. 
Artifacts related to program use and data movements are also retained in live memory 
(RAM) and it is recommended that this is captured and analysed.   
 
Keywords: Anti-forensics, IconCache.db, Portable Applications, USB forensics 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Running a functioning computer environment from a memory stick has 
become more and more viable thanks to developments in desktop virtualization 
technologies over the past decade. The computer environments concerned – 
which will be termed vPCs (Virtualized PCs) here – often provide a sub-set of 
features that can be found in desktop or laptop computers, they nevertheless 
allow the user to carry out every-day activities such as making, moving and 
copying files and accessing the Internet.  As well as portability, a number of 
these miniature systems are said, in advertising literature, to offer the user 
strong confidentiality: either it is said that no trace of vPC activity will be left 
on the host machine following use (Ceedo Technologies Ltd, 2010; MojoPac, 
2009) or it is said that no „personal data‟ will be left behind following use 
(Lupo PenSuite 2013, PortableApps, 2014). From a privacy point of view, this 
facility is deemed to be an advantage by proponents of technology. From an 
information security perspective, it could be seen as a new threat, expanding 
the risk of data loss or network corruption already posed by the use of USB 
memory sticks in general (Tetmeyer 2010) and modern ways of working such 
as BYOD (Garrity and Weir, 2010). For the digital forensic analyst, the use of 
vPCs presents a different challenge – one which this paper suggests is similar 
to that encountered when dealing with encryption and data wiping.  While 
evidence can be deliberately hidden or destroyed, traces of those actions can 
usually be found and can be beneficial to a digital forensic enquiry (Carlton 
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and Kessler, 2013; Maartmann-Moe et al., 2009). This research seeks to show 
that the same can be true for vPCs and also that further investigative results 
may be obtained by using advanced techniques such as live memory analysis 
and analysis of the pagefile. 
A number of research areas are touched on in this enquiry, importantly, the 
forensic analysis of artefacts retained on Windows operating systems by the 
use of USB connectable devices. Prior work in this field has largely 
concentrated on the Windows Registry (Carvey and Altheide, 2005; Mee and 
Jones, 2005), where it is possible to locate information regarding the type of 
device connected and the potential time frames for the activity as well as which 
programs may have been executed and with what frequency. Roy and Jain 
(2012), and Carvey (2005) have shown that other artefacts that could be useful 
to the digital forensic examiner may be stored in Link (.Lnk) files, Shortcuts 
and the PreFetch folder. These include file-related activities such as copying a 
file to a USB device. Log files, such as setupapi.dev.log in Windows XP and 
setupAPI.dev.log and setupapi.app.log in Windows Vista, 7 and 8 will record 
the first connection of a USB device (Cowen, 2013) providing information that 
can help corroborate that held in the Registry. Where the unauthorised or 
covert use of systems and programs is suspected, the analysis of the IconCache 
database can also be proved useful (Collie, 2013). This artefact has been shown 
to retain file paths to programs and processes that have run on both fixed and 
attached drives. These activities can be associated with individual user names 
which have been set up on the host computer.    
The miniature environments considered in this research are desktop 
virtualizations. The applications chosen for testing fall broadly into three 
categories: Virtual Machines, Application Virtualizations and Portable 
Applications. All are designed as standalone programs which will run on 
compatible computers without being installed. Virtual Machines allow for 
installed applications to interact with one another within the provided 
environment. This differentiates them from Application Virtualizations and 
Portable Applications, in which installed applications run separately from each 
other (Ceedo, 2010). The Virtual Machine (VM) as evidence has been explored 
by Brett Shavers (2008), who has noted that the use of a VM will tend to leave 
artefacts on the host system. The focus of Shavers‟ work is on the use of VMs 
which have been installed on a host computer rather than run from an external 
device. While he has drawn attention to the fact that VMs can be run from 
removable media and disposed after use, hindering the investigative process, 
this aspect of research has not been developed further. Barrett and Kipper 
(2010) also looked at the use of VMs, including some miniature environments, 
and monitored the changes made to a host system by use of the software. The 
results for the miniature VMs showed that, for Windows XP, traces of activity 
– for example caused by invoking the MojoPac package – could be retained in 
the Registry. Evidence of network protocols being opened was also found 
during live testing. These previous research projects have focused on the 
artefacts that may be created on a host system by various types of VMs. This 
paper seeks to extend this work by considering desktop virtualizations as a 
Athens Journal of Sciences March 2016 
             
19 
separate genre, by analysing Windows 7 as well as XP systems, by simulating 
user activity and recording the results and by considering memory dumps and 
page files as well as other artefacts recovered from live and static systems.  
The value of capturing and analysing live memory during digital forensic 
investigations has been recognised for many years (Solomon et al., 2007; 
Petroni et al., 2006; Casey and Seglem, 2004). Since the technique raises issues 
in respect of the forensical sound collection of evidence, the standard approach 
to computer analysis remains the capture of static systems, or what is 
colloquially known as „Pull The Plug‟. There are arguments to support both 
methods but live memory capture is now seen as an imperative for network and 
malware investigations as well as live response (Anson et al., 2012; Malin et 
al., 2012). 
Operating systems handle memory in a highly complex way. Russinovich 
and Solomon (2005), and Russinovich et al. (2012) provide a thorough 
discussion of Windows memory management, showing both how it implements 
virtual memory and how it manages the subset of virtual memory kept in 
physical memory. They explain that the Windows memory manager consists of 
several components that deal, amongst the things, with the allocation, 
reallocation and management of virtual memory. It is responsible for handling 
the paging process and for managing the size of the page file. 
An important aspect of paging files is that they cannot be deleted while the 
computer system is running. Furthermore, if the system has not been 
configured to clear the page file at shut down, any data placed there will be 
retained by the system. For Windows operating systems, 32-bit versions have a 
total virtual address space of 4 GB whereas 64-bit versions can have up to 16 
TB. From the point of view of forensic examiners, therefore, paging files may 
be of interest. However, when a large amount of memory is added to a 
computer, a paging file may not be required (Microsoft, 2014). 
The benefits of analysing the contents of virtual memory together with 
those of the page file(s) have been discussed by a number of authorities 
including Stimson (2008) and Kornblum (2007). A further avenue of enquiry is 
offered by the hibernation file, which may retain data of interest, for example 
from malware (Suiche, 2008) and encryption keys (Mrdovic and Huseinovic, 
2011). The analysis of the hibernation files goes beyond the scope of this paper 
but it is recommended as an area for future research. 
The desktop virtualizations considered in this paper can only be run after 
the host Windows operating system has been launched. Thus they interact with 
the host system, creating the potential for traces of user activity to be left 
behind. A further type of virtualisation, the Live USB i.e. a bootable USB stick 
containing an independent operating system, is not considered here.   
For this paper, experiments were conducted using examples of three types 
of virtualization. The operating systems used for full testing were Windows XP 
(32bit) and Windows 7 (32bit). Initial testing was also carried out on one 
Windows 7 (64 bit) system for the purpose of comparison. Over the period of 
research study, Windows XP and Windows 7 were the most popular family of 
operating systems in use. A high percentage of the computers presenting for 
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digital forensic examination at that time were therefore likely to be Windows 7 
and XP based systems. Although Windows 8 began to gain ground in the 
market place following its release in 2012, XP maintained a respectable 
following that only began to drop against the uptake of Windows 8 last year 
(W3schools.com, 2015).   
Digital forensic examiners have observed that the Windows 8 systems 
work in a broadly similar way to Windows 7, from an investigative point of 
view (Brunty, 2012; Wilson, 2013). While a number of new features were 
introduced with Windows 8, these mainly impact on how the users interact 
with their computers. A notable difference between Windows 7 and 8, in terms 
of this paper, is that the icons are no longer stored in the IconCache.db (Lee 
and Lee, 2014). Nevertheless, a textual record of USB-related activity is 
retained in the file. 
Further changes to the Windows OS have occurred with the release of 
Windows 10 this year. Importantly, according to research carried out at 
Champlain College in Vermont, USA (2015) the format of the Prefetch file has 
been changed to the extent that it is incompatible with current analysis 
software. Certain new features, e.g. the Spartan Browser, have also been 
introduced. The potential for more artefacts of investigative interest to exist on 
hard drives has thus been increased. As with previous versions of Windows, 
however, some artefacts appear to remain unchanged. With reference to the 
research presented in this paper, these include Event Logs, Internet Explorer, 
.lnk files and records of USB activity stored in the Registry.   
The following sections describe the author‟s research environment, method, 
experimentation and findings. Areas for further research are then suggested. 
 
 
Research Method  
 
The purpose of this research is to isolate information of potential 
evidential interest where a miniature computing environment has been 
introduced to a Windows host via a USB connectable device. The aim is to 
assist the digital forensic examiner to locate information which may either 
corroborate or suggest that unauthorised and, in some cases, possible criminal 
activity has taken place.   
 
Test Environment 
The physical hardware used was a single PC workstation with an Intel 
Celeron processor (E3400 @ 2.60 Ghz), 4 GB of RAM and a standard VGA 
card. The computer was not connected to any network for initial experiments. 
A clean installation of each test operating system was made onto a set of 
250GB hard disks which had previously been wiped using standard forensic 
hardware. For consistency, each was set up to run using UK English and with 
the time set to GMT London. A single user name and computer name was 
used. The individual test systems were created and then cloned to other 
previously sanitized disks. The latter were then used for experimentation 
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before being imaged. After this, they were wiped again and a new clone system 
was installed. 
The hardware used for imaging and cloning were: Logicube Talon and 
Logicube SuperSonix, respectively. 
 
Test Design Conditions 
In order to maintain consistency and the control sources of variables 
during experimentation, the test environment was designed to be as 
uncomplicated as possible. Each OS installed was created direct from an 
installation ISO. No patches or updates were installed. No additional programs 
or applications were installed. It is assumed that no enterprise solution that 
allows live system monitoring exists.  It is also assumed that the workstation is 
the only evidence source available to the digital forensic examiner.   
The above conditions are unlikely to be found in a real-life working 
environment - it would be unusual to find a computer system that was in an 
„out-of-the-box‟ state, for example – but in reality no two computers will 
present in the exact same way. Not all computer systems are kept fully patched, 
for instance, which may leave them vulnerable to malware attacks. An 
examiner should therefore assess each case individually.  
The test scenario aims to reproduce field conditions in which a „suspect‟ 
workstation is running when the digital examiner arrives. In common with 
current practice, once a memory dump has been obtained, the examiner halts 
the workstation by pulling the power cord from the back of the machine.   
 
Test Operating Systems 
The operating systems tested were: Windows XP Pro (32bit), Windows 7 
Pro (32-bit). Initial testing was carried out on Windows 7 Pro (64-bit).   
 
Test vPCs 
The miniature environments tested are shown in Table 1, together with 
their compatibility with the test operating systems under review. 
 
Table 1. Test vPC Applications and Windows Compatibility 
 
* = Application Virtualization 
 
Live memory content (RAM) was collected by introducing forensic 
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software to the host system via a USB connectable memory stick. The forensic 
software used was: FTK Imager Lite by Access Data and Windows Memory 
Toolkit 1.4 by Moonsols.  For static systems, data collection was carried out by 
attaching a write-blocked imager to the host hard disk following system 
shutdown via power cable disconnection.   
 
Data Analysis 
RAM Data 
RAM captures were analysed using HBGary Responder Community 
Edition v. 2.0.2.1438. Keyword searches for the names of the software in use 
and related processes were carried out on the memory dumps obtained. 
 
Static Systems 
For each experiment, the analysis of data collected from the static test 
systems consisted of scrutinizing five main areas of the Windows operating 
system for artefacts. These areas, which were identified based on research, 
preliminary system monitoring and working knowledge, were: Registry, 
Prefetch, Lnk files, IconCache.db and Pagefile. In the Registry, up to ten keys 
likely to retain artefacts as a result of USB-related activity were checked. The 
central aim was to find out whether the name of the vPC software in use could 
be pinpointed and whether particular user activities could be discovered.    
In a real-life situation, an examiner would pay attention to the finer detail 
of the dates and times associated with such activities, correlating information 
gathered from the Registry keys with that to be found, for example, in system 
event and setupapi logs.      
The software used for analysis was FTK v 5.1. 
 
Preliminary System Monitoring 
Preliminary system monitoring was carried out using the utility Process 
Monitor v3.1 from Microsoft. This identified Registry, process and thread 
activity which in turn informed the analysis to be carried out.   
 
Recording Findings 
Findings were recorded into a table devised for the purpose of collecting 
and collating results. It was found that a number of Registry keys retained 
similar information e.g. the name of the vPC executable. A sub-set of seven 
key system locations were found to yield the most detailed artefacts. These are 
shown in Table 2.  
 
Test Procedure  
Two main tests were carried out, the first to ascertain what artefacts from 
experimentation could be found in a memory dump taken from a live system, 
the second to ascertain what could be gathered from the same system, once 
static. The results were then compared. 
In the interests of brevity, only the most important results out of a total of 
54 outputs are reported in this paper. 
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Test Scenarios 
A series of scenarios were then developed with the aim of mimicking a set 
of basic general activities the user of a vPC would, in the view of the author, 
likely wish to carry out. These were numbered as follows: 
1) Copy a text file; vPC to host. 
2) Copy a text file; host to vPC. 
3) Run a program executable on the vPC. 
4) Write and save a text file on the vPC. 
5) Launch a browser on the vPC. 
6) Conduct a search on a vPC-based browser. 
Each of these activities was carried out for each test vPC application in the 
context of each compatible test operating system. In normal use, a vPC will 
either launch automatically in Windows Explorer or will open after the 
executable file is located on the container drive in Windows Explorer and 
double clicked. These methods were used throughout this research.  
 
 
Experimentation  
 
Method 
Two baseline experiments were first carried out for each combination of 
vPC and test OS, as follows: 
a) Introduce USB key containing vPC executable into the host system. No 
further action. 
b) Introduce USB key containing vPC executable into the host system. 
Run vPC. 
Thereafter, a first phase of experimentation involved testing three (3) 
applications in two (2) versions of Windows for each of the six (6) 
experimental test scenarios outlined in 2.6.1, above – a total of 36 outputs. A 
second phase involved testing one (1) application in one (1) version of 
Windows – a total of 6 outputs. A third phase involved testing two (2) 
applications in one version of Windows 7 – a total of 12 outputs.   
 
Results Overview 
Baseline Experiment 
For the two baseline experiments and for every combination of vPC and 
OS, the artefacts related to the attachment of the USB drive – such as the drive 
letter allocated to the device, its type and its serial number - were to be found 
in the Registry at: 
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CURRENTCONTROLSET\ENUM\U
SBSTOR 
          “                           \ SYSTEM\CURRENTCONTROLSET\ENUM\USB 
This result was expected since the USB enumeration process, during 
which the host machine reads a connected device‟s descriptors, loads the 
appropriate drivers for it and configures the device for use, occurs 
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automatically in Windows.   
For Baseline a), no artefacts relating to the name of the vPC stored on the 
drive were found in the Registry. For MojoPac alone, one reference to the 
executable file was found in the pagefile.  
For Baseline b) a large number of further artefacts, which identified the 
vPC being used, were located in the Registry, IconCache.db and elsewhere.  
The most useful „quick reference‟ locations for Windows XP and Windows 7 
32 bit systems are shown in Table 2.  
 
Table 2. Baseline b) Experimental Results in Windows XP & Windows 7 32-bit 
 
Test Scenarios 
All the following test results were recorded on Windows 7 Professional 32 
bit using Ceedo Personal v. 5.0.1.7, Portable Apps v.11.2 and Lupo PenSuite v. 
2013.04_Lite. MojoPac v.2.1.1.0 tested incompatible with Windows 7.  
Identical procedures were followed in every case.   
 
Tests 1 and 2 
Using copy and paste, when a text file was copied from the host to the vPC 
no artefacts which pointed to this action having happened were apparent in the 
key system areas chosen for scrutiny on static systems. The „Accessed‟ 
date/time property of the file altered during testing with Windows XP but it 
does not update by default in Windows 7. When a text file was copied from the 
vPC to the host, no artefacts to show the source drive or vPC were apparent in 
the key areas examined. However, the „Modified‟ date and time of the file 
preceded the „Created‟ and „Accessed‟ dates and times. This type of finding 
commonly indicates that a file has been created on some device other than the 
host and has been transferred from an external drive to the host.   
Following this experiment, the names of the files copied between host systems 
and vPCs during testing were found to be present in live memory dumps 
together with the drive letters allocated to associated devices at the point of file 
movement. No artefacts were found in the pagefile.       
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Test 3 
When a program executable was run from within a vPC, in all cases the 
action was recorded in the UserAssist Registry key. Where the deletion 
software „Eraser‟ was started from within PortableApps, for example, the 
named executable was retained as follows: 
 F:\PortableApps\EraserPortable\App\eraser\Eraser.exe 
Since the UserAssist key keeps a record of the applications that have been 
launched on a system, the number of times those applications have been 
launched plus associated date and time data, this finding was consistent with 
every-day analysis experiences. However, it was also found that icons for 
programs run from within the vPC environments tested were not retained in the 
IconCache.db. A likely reason for this outcome is that IconCache.db only 
retains the names of executable files that are located in the root of a connected 
drive. For example, icons for the vPC executables being used during this test 
e.g. ceedo.exe were to be found in the IconCache.db, along with a textual 
record. No artefacts were apparent in the pagefile. 
 
Test 4 
For this test, Notepad ++ was used to write a text document and save it to 
the vPC concerned. The results monitored showed that for all the vPCs, 
evidence that Notepad ++ had been run from within the named vPC on an 
external drive was held in the UserAssist key (Figure 1). The name of the 
document which had been created was not discernable when using Ceedo 
Personal. However, for both PortableApps and Lupo PenSuite artefacts were 
found.  In the case of PortableApps a .lnk file pointed to the named file on the 
external drive along with the volume name, number and allocated drive letter. 
In the case of LupoPenSuite, the named file could clearly be identified within 
the program‟s the „Documents‟ folder on the external drive both in the 
Registry‟s ComDlg32 key and in an associated .lnk file. Under normal 
conditions, the names of opened and saved files will be stored in theComDlg32 
key as a list, the most recently used files in terms of date and time being shown 
under the key name MRUList. Likewise, .lnk files will be created when a file is 
opened on from some source. 
 
Figure 1. Use of Notepad ++ from within Ceedo Personal Identified in the 
UserAssist Key 
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Tests 5 and 6 
When the browser Firefox Portable was launched on test vPCs, a record of 
the executable having run on the external drive was retained in the UserAssist 
key when using Portable Apps and Lupo PenSuite. For Portable Apps, a record 
was also located at: 
[root]/Windows/System32/config/System.Log 
as follows: 
PortableApps\FirefoxPortable\FirefoxPortable.exe 
and for Lupo PenSuite a record was located at: 
[root] /Windows/System32/Config/System 
as follows:  
\Lupo_PenSuite_v2013.04_Lite\Apps\Firefox Portable\FirefoxPortable.exe 
In the case of PortableApps, further artefacts found the \Explorer\Software 
key in the user‟s NTUser.dat file. Running the browser in PortableApps also 
resulted in deleted folders being kept on the host system which were clearly 
viewable in forensic software. No data was retained in the deleted folders.   
The browser preloaded in Ceedo was Firefox rather than Firefox Portable.  It 
was found that an uninstalled record was left in the UserAssist key after 
running the browser from within the tool and the closing of the vPC, as 
follows: 
E:\Ceedo\Program Files\Mozilla Firefox\uninstall\helper.exe 
This suggests that Ceedo is programmed to prompt Firefox to clean up 
after itself after use. 
Search terms were entered into each browser on each vPC after connecting 
the host system to the internet. No artefacts identifying the search terms used 
were found on the host systems during static analysis. This result was 
expected: when the Process Monitor was used to identify activity during 
experimentation it was observed that browser usage data was being written 
back to the vPC in play, rather than to the host. Later, when the vPCs were 
analysed individually using IEF v.6.3.2, the search terms which had been 
entered in at each browser were in fact found to be stored on the vPC 
concerned. 
 
Further Results 
As a further result of the experiments carried out, it was also possible to 
draw up a table of useful search terms for each vPC tested. These terms, which 
revealed artefacts present in both live and unallocated space, are given in Table 
3. 
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Table 3.  Search Terms for Test vPCs in Windows XP 32-bit 
 
Tests in Windows 7 64-bit 
Testing carried out for experiments 1 – 6 with the vPCs Ceedo Personal 
and PortableApps indicated that artefacts showing use of the software were 
retained in a similar way to 32-bit systems. For Ceedo Personal, on opening the 
program, artefacts were retained in the MountPoints2 key within the user‟s 
NTUser.dat file and in the IconCache.db. Use of the program Notepad++ was 
also shown in the UserAssist key, but use of Firefox was not. No trace of a 
document created and saved within the software was apparent in the Registry.  
For PortableApps, many more artefacts were retained on the host, including the 
filename of a document created and saved within the vPC in the ComDlg32 
key in the user‟s NTUser.dat file, showing the path to the file on the connected 
USB drive. 
 
 
Conclusions  
 
The introduction and use of USB-bound vPCs on Windows hosts can 
create numerous artefacts of interest to digital forensic examiners. The most 
informative will be found in Registry keys as well as in Link files / Shortcuts, 
Prefetch and the IconCache database. At a minimum, an analysis of these 
artefacts will enable an enquirer to establish the name of the vPC environment 
invoked, the user name under which it was introduced to the host and which 
programs were run from within it, together with relevant dates and times, the 
drive letter allocated to the containing USB key plus details enabling 
identification of that key, such as the make and serial number. All of this 
information is available when a computer has been closed down using the 
traditional „pull the plug‟ method. The Pagefile may be a further resource on 
static systems. 
This research has shown that the connection of a vPC does not preclude 
the Windows registry from retaining information which helps identify the 
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container drive. Once a vPC is running, the icon associated with its executable 
file will be stored in the IconCache.db for the user name involved and the 
ASCII portion of the file will document the program name and its associated 
file path. 
For some vPCs, the names of files created and saved within the miniature 
environment are retained on the host, together with the file path. Folders 
temporarily created on the host when a portable browser is used from a vPC 
and which are afterwards automatically deleted may also be visible within 
forensic software. This type of finding could further usefully inform a digital 
forensic investigation. Where the collection of live memory is possible, this 
can reveal the names of the files copied between a vPC and the host together 
with relevant file paths.   
 
 
Further Work  
 
Further research is needed in order to establish whether more pertinent 
artefacts could be gleaned from the contents of virtual memory for this and 
other user related activity. A number of new tools have been developed to aid 
this type of analysis in the past 18 months and outputs from these could 
usefully be compared and contrasted with those obtained from older tools. 
While results from the pagefile analysis during this round of research did 
not reveal much of note, further testing might produce something worthwhile. 
The host systems considered, were running the native OS alone, placing 
limited demands on memory. Also they were only run for short periods of time 
therefore there was little time for the artefacts to accumulate in the pagefile.   
Further research could help establish whether, in common with malware 
and encryption keys, artefacts of potential interest relating to the use of vPCs 
may be retained in a computer‟s hibernation file. It would also be useful to 
explore how various vPCs interact with the computer systems running 
Windows 8 and the newly released Windows 10 operating system.   
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